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THE INDEPENDENCE OF ALASKA’S 
JUDICIARY 
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ABSTRACT 
  The Alaska judiciary is constitutionally designed to be relatively 
independent of partisan interests: judges are selected through a merit-based 
process in which they are evaluated based upon their competence and 
qualifications. In the months before Alaska’s 2002 and 2008 judicial retention 
elections, the anti-abortion organization Alaska Right to Life sent judges 
questionnaires seeking to pin down their views on controversial legal and 
political issues. This Note explores the use of partisan judicial questionnaires 
in the context of Alaska’s merit-based system of judicial selection.  In doing 
so, it explores past partisan campaigns against Alaska judges and devotes 
much attention to Alaska Right to Life Political Action Committee v. 
Feldman. At issue in Feldman was whether provisions of the Alaska Code of 
Judicial Conduct prohibited judges from answering Alaska Right to Life’s 
2002 questionnaire and, if so, whether the provisions thereby violated judges’ 
First Amendment rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In September 2002 and, again, in September 2008, Alaska judges 
running for retention received questionnaire packets soliciting their 
views on disputed legal and political issues. The questionnaires, sent by 
Alaska Right to Life (AKRTL), sought the judges’ views on issues such 
as abortion and euthanasia. As AKRTL explained, it planned to 
publicize the judges’ responses to the questionnaire and, based on those 
responses, issue recommendations as to whether each judge should be 
retained. 
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Of the sixteen judges who received the 2002 questionnaire, only 
four responded and none answered any of the questions.1 Blaming the 
Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct for the judges’ demurral, AKRTL filed 
a lawsuit in 2004 challenging three of the Code’s provisions2—the 
“pledges and promises clause,”3 the “commit clause,”4 and the “recusal 
clause.”5 Basing its claims on Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,6 a 
United States Supreme Court decision invalidating the “announce 
clause” of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct on First Amendment 
grounds, AKRTL argued that provisions of the Alaska Code likewise 
violated judges’ First Amendment rights by forbidding judges to answer 
the questions contained in its questionnaire.7 Because the Ninth Circuit 
eventually dismissed AKRTL’s lawsuit on ripeness grounds,8 it is still an 
open question whether the relevant provisions of the Alaska Code will 
survive after White. AKRTL’s questionnaire and lawsuit also raise a 
broader issue: when a state has designed its judicial selection system to 
be as nonpartisan as possible, as Alaska has, how should it handle 
interest groups’ efforts to politicize that system? 
This Note explores the issue of judicial questionnaires in Alaska. 
Part I discusses the culture of the Alaska judiciary. Part II describes past 
attacks on Alaska judges and, against this background, tells the story of 
Alaska Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Feldman. Part III focuses 
on the White ruling, including lower courts’ interpretations of it, and 
Part IV considers, in light of White, the constitutionality of Alaska’s 
judicial speech restrictions. Recognizing that Alaska’s judicial speech 
restrictions could be invalidated, Part V explores ways of maintaining 
judicial independence and nonpartisanship in Alaska without those 
restrictions. 
 
 1. The judges who responded explained why they declined to answer the 
questions. See infra Part II.B. 
 2. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 
1080 (D. Alaska 2005), vacated, 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 3. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (2006) (prohibiting 
judicial candidates from “mak[ing] pledges or promises of conduct in judicial 
office other than to faithfully and impartially perform the duties of the office”). 
 4. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (2006) (prohibiting 
judicial candidates from “mak[ing] statements that commit or appear to commit 
the candidate to a particular view or decision with respect to cases, controversies 
or issues that are likely to come before the court”). 
 5. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(1) (2006) (requiring judges to 
disqualify themselves from hearing cases where their impartiality could 
reasonably be questioned). 
 6. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 7. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1081–82 (D. Alaska 2005). 
 8. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 
852–53 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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I. THE CULTURE OF ALASKA’S JUDICIARY 
Although the Alaska Constitutional Convention briefly discussed 
possible benefits of electing judges,9 delegates placed too great an 
emphasis on judicial independence to adopt an election system of 
judicial selection. As Judiciary Committee Chairman George 
McLaughlin warned, the judiciary in an election system is “dictated and 
controlled by a political machine.”10 Delegate Edward Davis, citing 
experiences in Idaho, cautioned that an elected judge is retained or 
dismissed “completely irrespective of qualifications.”11 Concerned with 
minimizing the influence of politics on Alaska’s judiciary, the 
Convention voted by an overwhelming majority to adopt a merit-based 
system of judicial selection.12 
A. Judicial Selection According to Merit 
Pursuant to the Alaska Constitution, judicial selection has three 
steps. First, the Alaska Judicial Council (“Council”)—comprised of three 
non-attorneys appointed by the governor, three attorneys appointed by 
the Alaska Bar Association, and the Chief Justice of the Alaska Supreme 
Court—evaluates judicial candidates and nominates at least two for each 
vacancy.13 Second, the governor fills the judicial vacancy by appointing 
 
 9. Alaska Constitutional Convention Minutes Concerning Judicial Selection 
and Retention, 583–611, available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/General/akc 
con.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
 10. Id. McLaughlin went on to note that a judge must “secure funds and 
sometimes excessive and exorbitant funds for the purposes of being elected . . . 
[and] keep peering over his shoulder to find out whether [a judicial decision] is 
popular or unpopular.” Id. at 584. 
 11. Id. at 598. 
 12. Id. at 610 (rejecting an amendment to strike section of proposed Alaska 
Constitution that would provide for merit-based system of judicial selection). 
Also known as the “Missouri Plan,” merit systems of judicial selection combine 
elements of the election and appointment methods to balance judicial 
accountability with judicial independence. Mark S. Cady & Jess R. Phelps, 
Preserving the Delicate Balance Between Judicial Accountability and Independence: 
Merit Selection in the Post-White World, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 343, 352 
(2008). Proponents of judicial election often argue that elections alone ensure 
judicial accountability, while proponents of judicial appointment argue that 
insulating judges from the electorate promotes judicial independence. Peter D. 
Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One “Best” Method?, 23 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1, 13–14, 17 (1995). 
 13. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 7–8; see also Susie M. Dosik, Alaska’s Merit 
Selection for Judges, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 305, 312–16 (2004). 
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one of the Council’s nominees.14 Finally, Alaska judges stand for 
retention at the first election held more than two or three years after 
their initial appointments and, after that, at various intervals depending 
on the court on which they sit.15 
The Council’s judicial nomination process is intentionally 
nonpartisan in its information gathering procedures and evaluative 
criteria.16 The Council’s initial evaluation of each judicial applicant 
includes background checks, public comment, an extensive interview of 
each candidate, and surveys of the Alaska Bar Association.17 Other 
nonpartisan considerations include the applicant’s pro bono and 
community service; counsel questionnaires, which are completed by 
attorneys involved in the applicant’s most recent cases that have gone to 
trial; signed bar survey comments; and reference letters.18 The Council 
does not consider an applicant’s political or religious beliefs.19 
 
 14. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5. For a discussion of one Alaska governor’s 
unsuccessful attempt to avoid appointing one of the Council’s nominees, see 
Dosik, supra note 13, at 323–24. 
 15. Elections are held every ten years for supreme court justices, every eight 
years for court of appeals judges, and every six years for superior court judges. 
ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 6 (setting forth retention election guidelines for 
supreme court justices and superior court judges); ALASKA STAT. § 15.35.053  
(2006) (setting forth retention election guidelines for court of appeals judges). 
Alaska district court judges stand for retention at the first election held more 
than two years after their initial appointments and, after that, every four years.  
ALASKA STAT. § 15.35.100 (2006). 
 16. See Dosik, supra note 13, at 312–16. Entrusted to seek the “most qualified” 
candidates, the Alaska Judicial Council “has never imposed any sort of litmus 
test to vet a candidate’s political views and does not inquire into a candidate’s 
views on controversial political subjects.” Id. at 315. 
 17. Selection Procedures, Alaska Judicial Council, available at http://www 
.ajc.state.ak.us/Selection/procedur.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). In its survey 
of Alaska Bar Association members, the Council asks Bar members to assign 
judicial applicants ratings between 1.0 and 5.0 in each of five nonpartisan 
criteria: professional competence, fairness, integrity, temperament, and suitable 
experience. While high ratings do not guarantee the Council will nominate an 
applicant, very few applicants with low Bar survey ratings are nominated. 
Alaska Judicial Council, Selecting and Evaluating Alaska’s Judges, 1984-2007, at 27 
(2008) (providing a detailed breakdown of Bar survey ratings of judicial 
applicants, judicial nominees, and judicial appointees since 1984). In each of the 
five criteria, judicial nominees receive bar survey scores that are an average of 
0.2 to 0.4 higher than those of the general judicial applicant pool. Id. at 28. The 
Council also surveys attorneys to provide demographical information so it can 
consider how an applicant is perceived by various groups of attorneys (e.g. by 
judges, men versus women, or prosecutors versus criminal defense attorneys) 
and identify where groups of attorneys are voting as a bloc, which may indicate 
motives other than merit. Id. at 25–26. 
 18. Id. at 29. 
 19. Id. at 30. The Council will, however, weigh “whether the applicant’s 
personal beliefs indicate a substantial bias or conflict of interest that could 
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Based on this information, the Council then evaluates each judicial 
applicant’s qualifications—both on her own merits and relative to other 
judicial applicants for the same position—using seven nonpartisan 
criteria of professional competence: communication skills; integrity; 
fairness; temperament; judgment including common sense; legal and life 
experience; and demonstrated commitment to public service.20 
Alaska’s retention elections are also designed to insulate judges 
from most partisan politics.21 The judges’ political affiliations, if any, are 
not publicized,22 and judges are usually not permitted to campaign.23 
Alaska’s retention elections are also non-adversarial; a judge standing 
for retention runs against no one and if not retained, his vacancy is filled 
by a new merit-selection appointee.24 Rooted in the notion that judges’ 
professional competence and integrity are of paramount importance 
(and are not correlated with their personal politics), this design 
encourages voters to weigh judges’ qualifications rather than party 
affiliation. Before each retention election, the Alaska Judicial Council 
conducts an evaluation of each state judge standing for retention and 
publicizes that evaluation, along with the Council’s recommendation for 
retention or non-retention, at least sixty days before the election.25 Like 
its nominations, the Council’s retention evaluations and 
recommendations are based on nonpartisan criteria related to judges’ 
qualifications and competence.26 
 
impede the proper functioning of the courts or show that the applicant would be 
unable to apply the law impartially.” Id. 
 20. Selection Procedures, Alaska Judicial Council, supra note 17. 
 21. See Dosik, supra note 13, at 324–25. Dosik also notes that interest groups 
have campaigned against judges but have never succeeded in “persuad[ing] the 
electorate to vote any judges out of office.” Id. at 325; see also infra Part II.a. 
 22. ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.030 (2006) (setting out ballot preparation guidelines 
in judicial retention elections). 
 23. Judges may, however, publicly answer attacks made against them or, if 
the Council makes a recommendation for non-retention, publicly answer that 
recommendation. See Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5C (2006); see also 
Antonia Moras, A Look at Judicial Selection in Alaska, ALASKA JUSTICE FORUM, Fall 
2004, at 8, available at http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/21/3fall2004/213 fall 
04.pdf. 
 24. See ALASKA STAT. § 22.05.080 (2006). 
 25. ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.05.100–150 (2006). 
 26. Alaska Judicial Council, Twenty-Third Report: 2005-2006 to the Legislature 
and Supreme Court, at Appendix F-1 to F-2 (2007). As part of its evaluation of trial 
court judges standing for retention, the Council surveys attorneys, peace and 
probation officers, court employees, jurors, along with social workers, guardians 
ad litem and volunteer children’s case workers, regarding the judges’ 
performance. All those surveyed evaluate the judges’ fairness, integrity, 
diligence, and temperament. Lawyers, who evaluate both trial and appellate 
court judges, also evaluate the judges’ legal ability. Alaska Judicial Council, 
Selecting and Evaluating Alaska’s Judges, 1984-2007, at 33 (2008). 
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B. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct 
The Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct (“Alaska Code”) establishes 
the standards for ethical conduct of Alaska judges and, in so doing, aims 
to maintain judicial integrity and independence.27 To this end, the 
Alaska Code contains both a “pledges and promises clause” and a 
“commit clause” restricting judicial candidates’ speech.28 Canon 
5A(3)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Alaska Code state that judicial candidates 
“shall not . . . make pledges or promises of conduct in judicial office 
other than to faithfully and impartially perform the duties of the office” 
or “make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate to a 
particular view or decision with respect to cases, controversies or issues 
that are likely to come before the court.”29 Additionally, the Alaska 
Code’s “recusal” clause requires a judge to disqualify himself from a 
proceeding “in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.”30 All three clauses are patterned after the 1990 American 
Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct.31 
Judicial speech restrictions like these are an effort to reconcile two 
democratic values—the impartial role of the judiciary and free political 
speech.32 As supporters of such clauses assert, if judges were permitted 
to promise specific rulings in cases likely to come before the court, 
“litigants would have the formal opportunity to argue, but those 
arguments would be for naught where the judge, if intent on keeping a 
campaign pledge to rule the opposite way, gave them but token 
consideration.”33 By promoting judicial impartiality, restrictions on 
judicial candidate speech likewise promote due process.34 
Opponents of such clauses argue that restrictions on judicial 
candidate speech are restrictions on political speech.35 Restricting speech 
in this way, they assert, prevents candidates from expressing their 
views, prevents the electorate from fully informing itself of those views, 
 
 27. See Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1 (2006) (“The provisions of 
this Code are intended to preserve the integrity and the independence of the 
judiciary. . . .”). 
 28. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) and (ii) (2006). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E (2006). 
 31. See Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Preamble (2006). 
 32. See David Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 
311–12, 318–24 (2008). 
 33. Brief for Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Appellants [hereinafter Brennan Center Brief] at 23, Kan. 
Judicial Watch v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 34. Id. See also Pozen, supra note 32, at 319–21. 
 35. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial 
Candidates Are Unconstitutional, 35 IND. L. REV. 735, 736–38 (2002). 
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and ultimately prevents voters from making an informed choice at the 
polls.36 
The drafters of the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct were aware of 
the First Amendment implications of judicial candidate speech 
restrictions. In the Commentary to Canon 5A(3)(d), the Alaska Code 
references Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board,37 a Seventh Circuit 
ruling invalidating an Illinois clause restricting judicial campaign 
speech.38 Though the Alaska Code, as amended in 1998, did not contain 
the clause invalidated in Buckley,39 drafters noted that even the pledges 
and promises clause could, if “read too broadly,” violate the First 
Amendment.40 The Commentary to Canon 5A(3)(d) thus concludes: 
“The Code should be interpreted in a manner that does not infringe First 
Amendment rights.”41 
II.  POLITICIZING JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS AND ALASKA 
RIGHT TO LIFE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE V. FELDMAN 
Despite the steps Alaska has taken to encourage nonpartisanship in 
its retention elections, elections are still subject to political influence. As 
one law professor argues, retention elections may be “the worst kind of 
election[s] to conduct for judges who have been sitting for long enough 
to acquire a record that can be mischaracterized on major league outfield 
fences.”42 In addition to mischaracterizing a judge’s record, political 
interest groups may encourage voters to retain or not retain a judge 
 
 36. See, e.g., id. 
 37. 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 38. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Commentary to Canon 5A(3)(d)  (2006) 
(referencing Buckley, 997 F.2d at 225). Holding that the clause was overbroad, the 
Seventh Circuit said it “reach[ed] far beyond speech that could reasonably be 
interpreted as committing the candidate in a way that would compromise his 
impartiality should he be successful in the election.” Alaska Code of Judicial 
Conduct, Commentary to Canon 5A(3)(d) (quoting Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228). 
 39. In Buckley, the Seventh Circuit invalidated the announce clause. 997 F.2d 
at 228. Prior to its 1998 revisions, the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct also 
contained an announce clause limiting judicial candidates’ speech. See Alaska 
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 7(B)(1)(c), rescinded by Supreme Court Order 
1322 (1998). Added in 1973 and amended in 1974, Canon 7(B)(1)(c) prohibited a 
judicial candidate from “announc[ing] his views on disputed legal or political 
issues.” Id. When Alaska’s Code was revised in 1998, the “commit clause” 
replaced the “announce clause.” Compare id., with Alaska Code of Judicial 
Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d) (2006). 
 40. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Commentary to Canon 5A(3)(d) (2006). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in 
Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 107–13, 114 (Summer 1998) 
(noting how easy it is to harm a candidate with accusations of little substance). 
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based on his or her decisions in a few select cases rather than viewing 
the judge’s overall record for fairness and competence. 
Alaska Right to Life (AKRTL) is a non-profit organization that has, 
as one of its goals, making sure those in positions of authority within 
Alaska, including judges, are friendly to its pro-life platform. To that 
end, AKRTL sometimes cold calls sitting judges or judicial nominees to 
solicit their opinions on issues like abortion and euthanasia.43 Another 
way the organization solicits judges’ opinions is by sending judicial 
candidates questionnaires in the months before retention elections are 
held.44 From AKRTL’s perspective, judges—regardless of their records 
for fairness and competence and their decisions in other cases—are 
unqualified for office if they do not share its views on abortion.45 
A. Previous Organized Attacks on Judges 
In past decades, partisan individuals and interest groups have 
targeted several highly competent Alaska judges for their decisions in 
select cases. While those campaigns have thus far been unsuccessful in 
persuading a majority of voters to remove the targeted judges,46 their 
successes and failures illuminate just how powerful such campaigns 
could be in the future. 
 
 43. Interview with Karen Lewis, Executive Director, Alaska Right to Life, by 
phone (Sept. 9, 2008). One way that Lewis has solicited these opinions over the 
phone is by asking questions such as when the judge believes life begins. Lewis 
said she does not publicize responses judges give her over the phone or share 
them with the governor but she does share them with the AKRTL Board of 
Directors. Id. 
 44. AKRTL likely made the initial decision to send questionnaires to Alaska 
judges following the 2002 National Right to Life convention. As Lewis 
explained, that was probably where she first heard about the United States 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and met 
attorney James Bopp. Id. 
 45. As the executive director of AKRTL explained, “If a legislator or a judge 
will not stand up and protect innocent human life in the womb, I do not trust 
[him] on any other issue.” Interview with Karen Lewis, Executive Director, 
Alaska Right to Life, by phone (Oct. 7, 2008). 
 46. See Dosik, supra note 13, at 325. Voters in Alaska have removed only four 
judges since statehood. Three of those were recommended for non-retention—
two in 1982 and one in 2006—by the Council for performance-related reasons. 
See Alaska Judicial Council, Twenty-Third Report: 2005-2006 to the Legislature and 
Supreme Court, at Appendix F-5 (2007). The fourth, the only jurist to be removed 
for political reasons, was an exceptional case. A few years after statehood, in an 
effort to limit the Alaska Supreme Court’s control over Alaska Bar Association 
activities, the Bar successfully campaigned against retention of Justice H.O. 
Arend. See Alaska Judicial Council, Fostering Judicial Excellence: A Profile of 
Alaska’s Judicial Applicants and Judges 14 n.36 (1999). 
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In 1980, Alaska Supreme Court Justice Warren Matthews was 
targeted for being in the majority in several unpopular Supreme Court 
decisions, including a decision regarding the Alaska Permanent Fund.47 
Despite the Alaska Judicial Council’s recommendation that Justice 
Matthews be retained,48 a last-minute ad campaign—sponsored by 
Chuck Imig, himself a candidate for the Alaska House of 
Representatives—almost cost Justice Matthews his seat on the court.49 
He was ultimately retained by the slimmest margin of any judge 
running for retention that year—53.5% “yes” votes.50 
In 1988, Alaska Supreme Court Justice Jay Rabinowitz, who had 
served on the supreme court bench since 1965,51 was also targeted for a 
handful of unpopular decisions.52 As with the campaign against Justice 
Matthews, the campaign against Justice Rabinowitz was launched less 
than a month before his retention election.53 One of the primary 
organizers of the campaign, Fritz Pettyjohn, was himself a political 
official.54 In response, attorneys Eric Sanders and Jeffrey Feldman 
registered a group called “Citizens to Retain Jay Rabinowitz” to counter 
the attacks.55 They raised nearly $40,00056 and launched a print 
campaign highlighting Justice Rabinowitz’s non-partisan characteristics 
of honesty, integrity, fairness, and dedication, as well as his thirty years 
 
 47. See “Zobel Case” Advertisement, paid for by Chuck Imig, THE 
ANCHORAGE TIMES, Nov. 3, 1980, at B-5 (on file with Alaska Judicial Council). 
 48. See Julie Anne Gold, Justice contemplates close call, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Nov. 6, 1980, at A-4. (on file with Alaska Judicial Council). 
 49. See “Zobel Case,” supra note 47; Gold, supra note 48. 
 50. Alaska Judicial Council, Twenty-Third Report: 2005-2006 to the Legislature 
and Supreme Court, at Appendix F-16 (2007). Four judges standing for retention 
that year were retained by 70% or more of voters, four were retained by 60% to 
69% of voters, and five were retained by 50% to 59%. Id. at Appendix F-16 to F-
20. 
 51. See id. at Appendix E-3. 
 52. See “Jay B. Mallot” Advertisement, paid for by Alaskans Against 
Retaining Rabinowitz, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 6, 1988, at J-4. 
 53. See Associated Press, Groups for, against Rabinowitz ready to turn up heat, 
THE ANCHORAGE TIMES, Oct. 30, 1988, at B-2. “Alaskans Against Retaining 
Rabinowitz” registered with the Alaska Public Offices Commission on October 
20, 1988. The retention election was held November 8, 1988. Id. 
 54. See id. Pettyjohn was a member of the Alaska House of Representatives. 
Id. 
 55. Interview with Jeffrey Feldman, Partner, Feldman Orlansky & Sanders, 
in Anchorage, Alaska (Aug. 21, 2008). See also Associated Press, Groups for, 
against Rabinowitz ready to turn up heat, supra note 53. 
 56. See Sheila Toomey, Attorney files formal complaint over anti-Rabinowitz 
donation, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Dec. 9, 1988, at C-2. So highly respected a 
jurist was Justice Rabinowitz within the Alaska legal community, Feldman said, 
“I’ve never raised so much money so fast.” Interview with Jeffrey Feldman, 
supra note 55. 
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of service to the Alaska legal community.57 In 1978, Justice Rabinowitz 
had been retained with 67.8% “yes” votes; in 1988, despite his counter-
campaign, he was retained with only 59% “yes” votes.58 
Finally, in 2000, abortion rights opponents targeted Alaska 
Supreme Court Justice Dana Fabe and Superior Court Judge Sen Tan for 
non-retention. In the years preceding the election, both judges issued 
decisions in abortion cases.59 Beginning in August, AKRTL sent mailers 
to its members and distributed flyers at the state fair asking voters to 
vote against retaining Justice Fabe and Judge Tan.60 As the chair of 
Alaskans for Judicial Reform, Fritz Pettyjohn again got involved in the 
judicial retention process by sending notices recommending non-
retention of Justice Fabe and Judges Tan and Peter Michalski, who 
issued a decision in a same-sex marriage case.61 Justice Fabe and Judge 
Tan both formed groups to support their retention, and their groups—
like the one formed on behalf of Justice Rabinowitz—highlighted the 
 
 57. See “Vote YES” Advertisement, paid for by Citizens to Retain Jay 
Rabinowitz, THE ANCHORAGE TIMES, Nov. 7, 1988, at D-6; “Vote YES” 
Advertisement, paid for by Citizens to Retain Jay Rabinowitz, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS, Nov. 8, 1988, at D-7. 
 58. See Alaska Judicial Council, Twenty-Third Report: 2005-2006 to the 
Legislature and Supreme Court, at Appendix F-16 (2007). 
 59. As a superior court judge in 1997, Justice Fabe wrote an order holding a 
hospital’s policy prohibiting abortions was unconstitutional under the privacy 
clause of the Alaska Constitution. See Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coalition, 
948 P.2d 963, 966 (Alaska 1997). The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the ruling. 
See id. In 1998, Judge Tan granted summary judgment and enjoined on equal 
protection grounds a law requiring most girls under 17 years old to obtain 
permission from a parent or judge before consenting to an abortion. See Planned 
Parenthood of Alaska v. State, No. 3AN-97-6014 CI, 1998 WL 35170806 (Alaska 
Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 1998). The Alaska Supreme Court reversed Judge Tan’s 
summary judgment order, State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 35 P.3d 30, 32 
(Alaska 2001), but later, in an opinion written by Justice Fabe, struck down the 
same law as an unconstitutional violation of the privacy clause of the Alaska 
Constitution, State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577, 579 (Alaska 
2007). 
 60. See “Out of Control Judges” Mailing, paid for by Alaska Right to Life, 
sent before 2000 retention election (on file with Alaska Judicial Council) 
(recommending against retention of Justice Dana Fabe and Judge Sen Tan, as 
well as Justices Warren Matthews and Alex Bryner and Judge Mary Greene); 
Baby “Wants You to Help Stop Abortions” Flyer, distributed by Alaska Right to 
Life (on file with Alaska Judicial Council) (recommending against retention of 
Justice Dana Fabe and Judge Sen Tan). 
 61. See “Judicial Retention Ballot Notice” Mailing, paid for by Alaskans for 
Judicial Reform, sent before 2000 retention election (on file with Alaska Judicial 
Council). In 1998, before the marriage amendment to the Alaska Constitution 
passed, Judge Michalski held that the Alaska Marriage Code violated the equal 
protection clause of the Alaska Constitution by prohibiting same-sex marriage. 
Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *5–6 
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). 
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jurists’ non-partisan characteristics.62 All three judges survived the 
election: Justice Fabe with 57.1% “yes” votes, Judge Michalski with 
56.9% “yes” votes, and Judge Tan with 54.4% “yes” votes.63 The average 
percentage of “yes” votes for all other judges running for retention that 
year was 65.1%.64 
“If you can eliminate a Justice Rabinowitz or a Justice Fabe—both 
among the highest ranked and most highly regarded judges the state 
ever has had—no judge is safe,” Feldman said.65 If a partisan interest 
group, angry over one or more of a judge’s decisions, targets him for 
non-retention and successfully moves enough voters to vote “no” in a 
future election, shockwaves would echo through Alaska’s judiciary. All 
Alaska judges would know that they, too, could be targeted for a 
politically unpopular decision. In this way, seeking to hold judges 
politically accountable can threaten judicial independence. 
 
 62. See “Fairness” Advertisement, paid for by Alaskans for Justice Dana Fabe, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 3, 2000, at B-13; “Dedication” Advertisement, paid 
for by Alaskans for Justice Dana Fabe, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 4, 2000, at 
A-6; “Integrity” Advertisement, paid for by Alaskans for Justice Dana Fabe, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 6, 2000, at A-4; “YES Judge Sen Tan” 
Advertisement, paid for by Alaskans for Judge Sen Tan, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Nov. 2000 (quoting delegate to the Alaska Constitutional Convention 
Seaborn Buckalew saying, “When we wrote the Alaska Constitution, we did our 
best to keep politics out of the courts. . . . That’s why I fully support the retention 
of Judge Sen Tan. He’s honest, fair, and makes decisions based on law, not 
politics.”). 
 63. Alaska Judicial Council, Twenty-Third Report: 2005-2006 to the Legislature 
and Supreme Court, at Appendix F-16, F-18 (2007). 
 64. See id. at Appendix F-16 to F-20. In terms of measuring the impact of non-
retention campaigns on retention votes, this average is, if anything, conservative; 
it includes the percentage of “yes” votes Superior Court Judges Dale Curda and 
Mary Greene received—56.3% and 51.9%, respectively—despite some 
opposition to both judges’ retention. Id. at Appendix F-20. 
 65. Interview with Jeffrey Feldman, supra note 55. 
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B. The Alaska Right to Life Judicial Questionnaire 
In October 2002, sixteen66 state court judges standing for retention 
in Alaska’s November election received a questionnaire from AKRTL.67 
According to Karen Lewis, executive director of AKRTL, its members do 
not have enough information about judges’ personal views on abortion 
and related issues to make an informed decision at the polls.68 To obtain 
that information, the AKRTL questionnaire solicited judges’ opinions on 
several controversial legal and political issues, including abortion and 
euthanasia.69 As a letter accompanying the questionnaire stated, AKRTL 
planned to inform voters of the judges’ responses and “advise [its] 
members to vote for non-retention” in the event a judge chose not to 
respond.70 
Following statements about controversial legal and political 
issues,71 the questionnaire asked judicial candidates to check “Agree,” 
 
 66. According to election records, sixteen judges stood for retention in 2002. 
See Alaska Judicial Council, Twenty-Third Report: 2005-2006 to the Legislature and 
Supreme Court, at Appendix F-16 to F-20 (2007); State of Alaska – General 
Election November 5, 2002 – Official Results, http://www.elections. 
alaska.gov/02genr/data/results.htm (Nov. 5, 2002). Both Alaska Right to Life 
and the State of Alaska’s briefs agreed that all Alaska judges standing for 
retention received the questionnaire. Brief of Appellants at 5, Alaska Right to 
Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, Nos. 05-35902(L), 05-36027 (9th Cir. 
Sept. 21, 2007); Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 5, Alaska Right to Life 
Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, Nos. 05-35902(L), 05-36027 (9th Cir. Sept. 21, 
2007); Interview with Karen Lewis, supra note 43. For these reasons, and despite 
the fact that the State of Alaska’s brief and Ninth Circuit’s opinion state that 
twelve Alaska judges received AKRTL’s questionnaire, this Note refers to 
sixteen judges receiving the questionnaire. 
 67. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 
843 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 68. Interview with Karen Lewis, Executive Director, Alaska Right to Life, by 
phone (Nov. 11, 2008). 
 69. Id; see also Verified Complaint for Relief at Exhibit C-1 and Exhibit E-3 to 
E-6 [hereinafter Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. Complaint]; Alaska 
Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D. Alaska 
2005). The questionnaire also addressed disposition of fertilized eggs following 
in vitro fertilization and causes of action for wrongful life and wrongful birth. 
Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. Complaint at Exhibits E-5 to E-6. 
 70. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. Complaint, supra note 69, at 
Exhibit C-1. 
 71. Issue statements were one paragraph in length and concluded with a 
final sentence in bold print. Id. at Exhibits E-3 to E-6. The concluding statements 
regarding abortion included: “I believe that the unborn child is biologically 
human and alive and that the right to life of human beings should be respected 
at every stage of their biological development,” as well as “I believe that Roe v. 
Wade was wrongly decided,” and “I believe that there is no provision in our 
current Alaska Constitution which is intended to protect a right to abortion.” Id. 
at Exhibits E-3 to E-4. An issue statement regarding euthanasia read, in part, “I 
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“Disagree,” “Undecided,” or “Decline.”72 Next to the “Decline” option, 
an asterisk directed the questionnaire’s recipient to a statement at the 
bottom of each page: “This response indicates that I believe in good faith 
that, under a reasonable construction of applicable Canons of Judicial 
Conduct or because my recusal would be subsequently required, I must 
decline to respond to this particular question.”73 Within a few days of 
receiving the questionnaire, several judges contacted Marla Greenstein, 
executive director of the Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct (the 
“Commission”), the organization that reviews allegations of judicial 
misconduct.74 She conferred with Jeffrey Feldman, then-chairman of the 
Commission,75 and they decided that Greenstein would send a letter to 
AKRTL expressing her personal concerns about the propriety of judges 
answering the questionnaire and would copy Alaska judges on the letter 
to provide them informal guidance. She would not, however, ask the 
Commission to issue a formal advisory opinion.76 Sending this kind of 
letter would accomplish two things: first, since it was not a formal 
advisory opinion, it would preserve a ripeness argument for the legal 
battle likely to ensue; second, and more importantly, it would protect 
judges from having to respond by giving them public, albeit informal, 
guidance.77 
In her letter, Greenstein noted that Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White78 addressed a clause absent from the Alaska Code, that Alaska has 
a different system than Minnesota of selecting its judges, and that other 
provisions of the Alaska Code restrict judges’ freedom of expression.79 
“It is my professional opinion,” Greenstein added, “that judges who 
answer the questions in your questionnaire would be creating situations 
 
believe that there is no provision of our current Alaska Constitution which is 
intended to protect a right to assisted suicide.” Id. at Exhibit E-5. 
 72. Id. at Exhibits E-3 to E-6. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Interview with Marla Greenstein, Executive Director, Alaska 
Commission on Judicial Conduct, in Anchorage, Alaska (Aug. 13, 2008). Judges 
often contact Greenstein for informal guidance about the appropriate scope of 
their speeches before groups. Id. 
 75. Id.; Interview with Jeffrey Feldman, supra note 55. 
 76. Id. Under the Commission’s rules, Feldman, as chair of the Commission, 
had discretion to decide which matters would be handled informally and which 
matters to place on the agenda for full Commission consideration. Alaska 
Judicial Conduct Commission Rules, Rule 1(c)(1); Comment from Jeffrey 
Feldman, Partner, Feldman Orlansky & Sanders, to Kelly Taylor, Editor-in-
Chief, Alaska Law Review (Aug. 30, 2008). 
 77. Interview with Jeffrey Feldman, supra note 55 (detailing Feldman’s intent 
to “give the judges cover”). 
 78. 536 U.S. 765 (2002); see discussion infra Part III.A. 
 79. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. Complaint, supra note 69, at 
Exhibit D-1. 
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that would require them to be disqualified from sitting on cases 
involving those issues.”80 Having received the letter, none of the judges 
requested a formal advisory opinion.81 
Of the sixteen judges who received the questionnaire, only four 
responded and none expressed a view on any of the issues discussed.82 
In lieu of answering the questions, the four judges who responded 
offered explanations for their decisions not to provide answers.83 After 
selecting “Decline”84 in response to most of the questions, Alaska 
Supreme Court Justice Walter Carpeneti wrote, “I am not at all certain 
that responding to your group’s questions is allowed under the Alaska 
code and that it would not subject me to later recusal.”85 He then 
directed AKRTL to three cases in which he participated that he said 
“rais[ed] some of the issues covered in your questionnaire.”86 District 
Court Judge Jane Kauvar also selected “Decline” in response to each 
question and, in a blank space at the end of the questionnaire, she 
simply wrote, “Based on advice from Judicial Conduct Commission in 
my state.” 87 Superior Court Judge Charles Pengilly appeared interested 
in answering the questionnaire88 but nonetheless selected “Decline” in 
response to each question,89 explaining, “It appears that the appropriate 
response to your questionnaire under the present circumstances is to 
decline to answer.”90 District Court Judge Sigurd Murphy did not return 
a completed questionnaire but sent a letter to AKRTL declining to 
 
 80. Id. at Exhibit D-1 to D-2. 
 81. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 
847 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 82. Id. at 843. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. Complaint, supra note 69, at 
Exhibit E-1 to E-2. Justice Carpeneti amended the “Decline” statement at the 
bottom of each page to say “recusal might be subsequently required” rather than 
“recusal would be subsequently required” (emphasis added). Id. at Exhibit E-3 to 
E-6. He left two questions about whether a constitutional right to abortion exists 
at the federal and state levels blank. Id. 
 85. Id. at Exhibit E-1. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. Complaint, supra note 69, at 
Exhibit E-16 to E-19. 
 88. “Unhappily,” Judge Pengilly wrote, “White may have no impact at all on 
the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct.” Id. at Exhibit E-10. He added, “I agree 
with your basic premise: that if ‘judicial candidates’ in Alaska are free to discuss 
these issues, the voters are entitled to know what their views are. I hesitate to 
answer only because it is far from clear that judges in Alaska have that 
freedom.” Id. 
 89. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. Complaint, supra note 69, at 
Exhibit E-11 to E-14. 
 90. Id. at Exhibit E-10. 
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answer the questions “for the reasons set forth in the October 16, 2002 
letter addressed to you from the Alaska Commission on Judicial 
Conduct” and included a copy of his personal “Judge’s Code.”91 
Murphy’s response suggested that answering the questionnaire might 
not only violate the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct but his personal 
sense of judicial ethics as well.92 
AKRTL did not send questionnaires to judges standing for 
retention in Alaska’s November 2004 election.93 
C. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Feldman 
Two years later, before the 2004 election, AKRTL and Michael 
Miller, former president of the Alaska State Senate,94 filed suit in federal 
court challenging portions of the Alaska Code as unconstitutionally 
restricting judicial candidates’ speech rights.95 AKRTL and Miller 
targeted the Code’s pledges and promises clause, commit clause, and 
recusal clause.96 They named as defendants eight members of the 
Commission, including Feldman, and six members of the Disciplinary 
Board of the Alaska Bar Association.97 In August 2005, a federal district 
court in Alaska upheld the Code’s recusal clause but held the pledges 
and promises clause and commit clause unconstitutional.98 
 
 91. Id. at Exhibit E-7 to E-9. 
 92. As Judge Murphy stated: 
Certain members of the public do not fully differentiate between the 
personal convictions held by a judicial officer from that judicial officer’s 
responsibility to uphold the law in his or her decisions, irrespective of 
their personal view. Thus, if I were to emphatically express my view on 
such topics as abortion, assisted suicide, and euthanasia, the same 
would suggest to certain members of the public that I have pre-judged 
those issues that may come before me as a judge and should require my 
disqualification from sitting on cases involving those issues. 
Id. 
 93. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 
847 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 94. See Alaska State Legislature (former official website for House and 
Senate Legislative Majorities) – Senator Mike Miller, http://www.akrepublicans 
.org/pastlegs/Miller.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2008). 
 95. Feldman, 504 F.3d at 843. Miller was party to the suit as an independent 
voter who wanted to receive information from AKRTL regarding judges’ 
responses to its 2002 questionnaire. See Alaska Right to Life Political Action 
Comm. Complaint, supra note 69, at 6. 
 96. Feldman, 504 F.3d at 843. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 
1080, 1082–84 (D. Alaska 2005) (holding that the pledges and promises and 
commit clauses infringed the same speech challenged in White yet were 
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In September 2007, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s 
rulings and held that the case was not ripe for review.99 To survive a 
ripeness inquiry, the plaintiffs required real threats of investigation from 
the Commission and of disciplinary action by the Alaska Supreme 
Court.100 First, the Ninth Circuit noted that no judge had requested, and 
the Commission had not issued, a formal advisory opinion.101 The 
decision by Greenstein and Feldman not to ask the Commission to 
consider issuing an advisory opinion regarding the propriety of 
responding to the questionnaire thus functioned in precisely the way 
they had hoped.102 Second, the Ninth Circuit said it “lack[ed] any reason 
to expect the Alaska Supreme Court to adopt and act upon a 
[Commission] recommendation that ran afoul of the First Amendment,” 
particularly since the Alaska Supreme Court had never interpreted the 
challenged provisions.103 Finally, noting that neither plaintiff was subject 
to the Alaska Code, the Ninth Circuit said the plaintiffs had not shown 
they would suffer hardship without preenforcement review and called 
AKRTL’s decision not to send questionnaires in 2004 a result of “futility 
rather than First Amendment chill.” 104 The Ninth Circuit did not reach 
the issue of standing.105 
III. CHALLENGING JUDICIAL CANDIDATE SPEECH RESTRICTIONS 
ON FIRST AMENDMENT GROUNDS 
Alaska Right to Life (AKRTL) based its claims in Feldman on 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,106 a 2002 case that defines the 
current standards for invalidating judicial candidate speech restrictions 
under the First Amendment. Determining the constitutionality of 
restrictions on judicial candidate speech requires reconciling two 
competing principles: “Candidates for public office should be free to 
express their views on all matters of interest to the electorate. Judges 
should decide cases in accordance with law rather than with any express 
 
unnecessary to ensuring judicial impartiality and granting plaintiffs’ motion for 
summary judgment regarding the clauses). 
 99. Feldman, 504 F.3d at 852–53. 
 100. Id. at 849–51. 
 101. The Ninth Circuit held that Greenstein’s letter “at most constituted 
informal guidance” and therefore had no legal effect. Id. at 849–50. 
 102. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 103. Feldman, 504 F.3d at 850 (citing commentary to Canon 5A(3)(d) that 
stated, “[t]he Code should be interpreted in a manner that does not infringe First 
Amendment rights”). 
 104. Id. at 851. 
 105. Id. at 849. 
 106. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
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or implied commitments that they may have made to their campaign 
supporters or to others.”107 Although White was a narrow decision, 
confined to invalidating a specific speech restriction called the 
“announce clause,” the holding’s broad reasoning suggests that the 
United States Supreme Court has reconciled these competing principles 
to permit judicial candidate speech in all but the narrowest 
circumstances. 
A. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and the Constitutionality 
of the “Announce Clause” in an Election System of Judicial 
Selection 
In White, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a provision 
in the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting candidates for 
elected judicial office from announcing their views on disputed legal 
and political issues.108 According to the Court, this provision in 
Minnesota’s code, known as an “announce clause,” violated candidates’ 
First Amendment rights.109 
Justice Scalia, writing for a majority of five justices, applied the test 
of strict scrutiny.110 “[T]he announce clause,” he wrote, “both prohibits 
speech on the basis of its content and burdens a category of speech that 
is ‘at the core of our First Amendment freedoms’—speech about the 
qualifications of candidates for public office.”111 To survive strict 
scrutiny, the clause needed to be (1) narrowly tailored to serve (2) a 
compelling state interest.112 
First, the Court considered interests the state alleged were served 
by the announce clause: preserving the impartiality and appearance of 
impartiality of the state judiciary. The word “impartiality,” Justice Scalia 
wrote, can mean “lack of bias for or against either party to the 
proceeding,” “lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular 
legal view,” or open-mindedness.113 The Court seemed to suggest that 
impartiality in the first sense, which ensures equal protection under law, 
is a compelling state interest.114 Because the announce clause restricted 
 
 107. Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 227 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 108. White, 536 U.S. at 788. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 774. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that strict scrutiny was the 
appropriate test; none of the parties involved disputed that conclusion. Id. 
 111. Id. (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861, 863 
(8th Cir. 2001)). 
 112. Id. at 774–75. 
 113. Id. at 775–78 (emphasis in original). 
 114. Id. at 775–77. 
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speech on certain issues rather than parties, however, it was not 
narrowly tailored to serve a state interest within this first meaning of 
impartiality.115 Ensuring a lack of bias for or against a legal view, the 
Court concluded, is both impossible and undesirable;116 achieving 
impartiality or the appearance of impartiality in the second sense, 
therefore, cannot be a compelling state interest.117 Finally, skeptical that 
Minnesota drafted the clause to guarantee judicial open-mindedness, the 
Court called the announce clause “woefully underinclusive”118 if meant 
to achieve that purpose and did not determine whether judicial open-
mindedness is a compelling state interest.119 Having concluded that the 
announce clause did not survive strict scrutiny under any interpretation 
of “impartiality,” the Court invalidated it.120 
The justices in the majority were unsympathetic to the state’s use of 
judicial speech codes to protect judicial independence within elected 
judiciaries. As Justice O’Connor stated in her concurring opinion, by 
opting to select its judges through elections rather than appointments or 
the merit system, Minnesota “has voluntarily taken on the risks to 
judicial bias” inherent in election systems.121 While careful not to 
 
 115. Id. at 776–77. 
 116. Id. at 777–78. The Court quoted Justice Rehnquist: 
Since most justices come to this bench no earlier than their middle 
years, it would be unusual if they had not by that time formulated at 
least some tentative notions that would influence them in their 
interpretation of the sweeping clauses of the Constitution and their 
interaction with one another. . . . Proof that a justice’s mind at the time 
he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of 
constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, 
not lack of bias. 
Id. (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (memorandum opinion)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 780. After becoming a candidate but prior to his election, the 
judicial candidate could not announce his views on disputed legal and political 
issues; prior to declaring his candidacy and after being elected, however, a 
judicial candidate was not prohibited from announcing such views. The Court 
held the announce clause to be underinclusive for the purpose of ensuring 
judicial open-mindedness because the proposition “that campaign statements 
are uniquely destructive of open-mindedness” had not been established. Id. at 
778–81. 
 119. Id. at 780. 
 120. Id. at 788. 
 121. Id. at 792 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Risks to judicial bias in selecting 
judges through election include judges “likely . . . feel[ing] that they have at least 
some personal stake in the outcome of every publicized case” and, where 
judicial candidates have had to fundraise to fund their campaigns, judges 
“feeling indebted to certain parties or interest groups.” Id. at 788–90. Even where 
judges are able to stifle these feelings, the possibility that they would be unable 
to do so risks undermining public confidence in the judiciary. Id. These are risks 
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criticize election systems in principle,122 Justice Kennedy expressed a 
similar view in his concurring opinion: “The State cannot opt for an 
elected judiciary and then assert that its democracy, in order to work as 
desired, compels the abridgment of speech.”123 
In two dissenting opinions, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer asserted that judicial campaign speech does not warrant the same 
level of protection of other political speech. Because different work is 
required of judges and legislators—it being “the business of judges to be 
indifferent to unpopularity”—judicial and legislative campaigns have 
different speech requirements.124 As Justice Ginsburg wrote, “[T]he 
rationale underlying unconstrained speech in elections for political 
office—that representative government depends on the public’s ability 
to choose agents who will act at its behest—does not carry over to 
campaigns for the bench.”125 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent also articulated 
ways in which the majority had misconstrued the breadth of the 
announce clause126 and misunderstood its crucial role in Minnesota’s 
judicial system.127 
 
Minnesota accepted when it adopted a pure election system for judicial 
selection, as opposed to an appointment or a merit-based system. Id. at 792. 
 122. Id. at 795–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“States are free to choose this 
mechanism rather than, say, appointment and confirmation. By condemning 
judicial elections across the board, we implicitly condemn countless elected state 
judges and without warrant.”). 
 123. Id. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 124. Id. at 797–803 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 125. Id. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 126. Id. at 809–12 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that the announce clause 
permitted a candidate to discuss general policy views, past judicial decisions, 
and her concept of the role of a judge, and prevented the candidate only from 
“publicly making known how [she] would decide disputed issues”) (quoting 
Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 881–82 (8th Cir. 2001)) 
(emphasis in original). 
 127. Id. at 812–21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As Justice Ginsburg asserts, the 
announce clause is necessary to prevent judicial candidates from circumventing 
speech restrictions under the pledges and promises clause. Without the 
announce clause, candidates could circumvent the pledges and promises clause 
by making statements that clearly bind them to legal positions by adding, “I 
cannot promise anything.” Preventing the pledges and promises clause from 
becoming an overly formalistic restriction, the announce clause is indispensable 
to Minnesota’s system for “balanc[ing] the constitutional interests in judicial 
integrity and free expression within the unique setting of an elected judiciary.” 
Id. 
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B. Reactions to White 
After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,128 one open question is 
whether other judicial candidate speech restrictions pass constitutional 
muster. In the years since White, most courts have held recusal clauses to 
be narrowly tailored and therefore constitutional.129 The pledges and 
promises clause and commit clause,130 however, stand on shakier 
ground. Several federal district courts have reasoned that these clauses 
function as announce clauses and, thus, likewise violate the First 
Amendment.131 The two state courts and single federal district court 
upholding judicial candidate speech restrictions have done so by 
construing them narrowly enough to permit a wide spectrum of political 
speech.132 Circuit courts, for the most part, have avoided reaching the 
 
 128. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 129. See Fla. Family Policy Council v. Freeman, No. 4:06cv395-RH/WCS (N.D. 
Fla. Sept. 11, 2007); Ind. Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 463 F. Supp. 2d 879, 886–87 
(N.D. Ind. 2006); Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1234–35 (D. 
Kan. 2006); Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 
2d 1080, 1083–84 (D. Alaska 2005); N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. 
Supp. 2d 1021, 1043–44 (D.N.D. 2005); Family Trust Found., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 
345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 705–11 (E.D. Ky. 2004). But see Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. 
Supp. 2d 968, 970, 977 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (holding that, like the announce clause, a 
clause requiring recusal where the judge “has made a public statement that 
commits, or appears to commit, the judge with respect to . . . an issue in the 
proceeding [or] the controversy in the proceeding” unconstitutionally chills 
judicial candidates’ speech). 
 130. Patterned after the 1990 version of the American Bar Association Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct and almost identical to Alaska’s clauses, these clauses 
prohibit judicial candidates from “mak[ing] pledges or promises of conduct in 
office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the 
office” and from “mak[ing] statements that commit or appear to commit the 
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come 
before the court.” See, e.g., Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 1024. 
 131. Id. at 1039, 1044–45; Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 697, 711 (issuing a 
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the clauses); see also Shepard, 463 F. 
Supp. 2d at 879, rev’d, 507 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2007); Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 
1080, vacated, 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 132. Pa. Family Inst. v. Celluci, 521 F. Supp. 2d 351, 372–88 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(relying on an affidavit by the Chief Counsel of the Judicial Conduct Board and 
interpreting the Pennsylvania Code to permit “[a]ny speech by a judicial 
candidate short of a pledge, promise, or commitment to adjudicate a particular 
result”); In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 87 (Fla. 2003) (holding that Florida’s pledges 
and promises and commit clauses barred judicial candidates only from 
“promising to act in a partisan manner by favoring a discrete group or class of 
citizens,” not from stating their personal views on disputed issues); In re 
Watson, 100 N.Y. 2d 290, 301 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that, rather than prohibiting 
all pledges and promises except those promising impartial performance of duty, 
New York’s pledges and promises clause allowed judicial candidates to “promise 
future conduct provided such conduct is not inconsistent with the faithful and 
impartial performance of judicial duties”). 
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merits of these claims; some have dismissed the cases on standing or 
ripeness grounds,133 while others, recognizing an important state 
interest in regulating its judiciary, have invoked abstention doctrines.134 
The American Bar Association (ABA) also worried that the pledges 
and promises clause and commit clause were vulnerable to a First 
Amendment challenge.135 Those concerns led the ABA to make two 
interesting, substantive revisions in its newest Model Code.136 First, the 
Model Code answers White’s concerns that the relevant restrictions were 
underinclusive137 by applying the relevant restrictions to both judges 
and judicial candidates.138 Second, it collapses the pledges and promises 
clause and commit clause into one narrow restriction prohibiting only 
promises inconsistent with judicial impartiality.139 The previous 
approach, which prohibited all promises other than that of judicial 
 
 133. Ind. Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 507 F.3d 545, 549–50 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the organization had failed to establish the presence of a willing 
speaker, as required to meet standing requirements); Alaska Right to Life 
Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 852–53 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that plaintiffs had not shown a real threat that the clauses would be enforced); 
Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 169 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that the 
organization had failed to establish the presence of a willing speaker, as required 
to have standing in a “right to listen” First Amendment case, and failed to 
establish a real threat of enforcement, as required for the case to be ripe). 
 134. Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1118–22 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(citing the rationale behind the Pullman abstention doctrine—that state law 
underlying the plaintiff’s claims was unclear and resolving those issues could 
obviate or alter the constitutional issues at stake—and certifying five questions 
related to the meaning of certain canons in the Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct 
for the Kansas Supreme Court); Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial 
Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 67–68 (2d Cir. 2003) (invoking Younger abstention and 
holding it appropriate to abstain from exercising jurisdiction where disciplinary 
proceedings against the judge had already commenced). 
 135. Matthew J. Medina, The Constitutionality of the 2003 Revisions to Canon 
3(E) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1072, 1081–82 n.42 
(2004) (quoting the Working Group on the First Amendment and Judicial 
Campaigns, which revised the restrictions, as concluding that both the pledges 
and promises and commit clauses, like the announce clause, are content-based 
speech restrictions and would be subject to strict scrutiny analysis); see also Nat 
Stern, The Looming Collapse of Restrictions on Judicial Campaign Speech, 38 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 63 (2008). 
 136. Mark Harrison, Chair Message on 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct, http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics (last accessed Nov. 5, 2008). 
 137. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 779–81 (2002). 
 138. As the introduction to Canon 4 states, “[a] judge or candidate for judicial 
office shall not engage in political or campaign activity that is inconsistent with 
the independence, integrity, or impartiality of the judiciary.” Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct, American Bar Association (2007), available at http://www 
.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf. 
 139. See id. 
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impartiality, implicated a wider spectrum of judicial speech.140 While 
commentary accompanying the restrictions borrows Justice Ginsburg’s 
theme of judicial independence from political influence,141 the act of 
narrowing the restrictions responds to White’s majority opinion by 
anticipating the restrictions’ relationship to Justice Scalia’s three 
meanings of impartiality. With “impartial performance” left open-
ended, the restriction can take on any of the definitions of impartiality 
White deems a compelling state interest. Further, the restriction, 
prohibiting only that which contravenes impartial judicial performance, 
could not be narrower. 
C. The Nationwide Effort to Politicize Judicial Elections 
The Indiana law firm of Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom has been the 
driving force behind the majority of cases challenging judicial speech 
restrictions, and its focus is not only on Alaska but on the nation as a 
whole. In addition to arguing White before the Supreme Court of the 
United States, James Bopp, Jr.142 was involved in Alaska Right to Life 
Political Action Committee v. Feldman,143 at least three other cases that 
 
 140. As Rule 4.1(A)(13) states, “judges and judicial candidates shall not . . . in 
connection with cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.” Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct, American Bar Association (2007), available at http:// 
.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf. This mirrors the 
narrowing constructions some courts have given the restrictions. See, e.g., In re 
Watson, 100 N.Y.2d 290, 310 (N.Y. 2003). 
 141. As Comment 1 to Rule 4.1 states, the role of a judge, who decides cases 
on law and facts, is different from the role of a legislator or member of the 
executive branch, who makes decisions in accordance with the views and 
preferences of the electorate. Model Code of Judicial Conduct, American Bar 
Association (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_ 
MCJC_approved.pdf. “[I]n furtherance of this interest, judges and judicial 
candidates must, to the greatest extent possible, be free and appear to be free 
from political influence and political pressure.” Id. 
 142. Among other professional affiliations, Mr. Bopp is General Counsel for 
the National Right to Life Committee, Special Counsel for Focus on the Family, 
and General Counsel for the James Madison Center for Free Speech. James 
Madison Center for Free Speech, Firm Biography, http://www.jamesmadison 
center.org/firmbio.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 143. 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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went to the circuit court level,144 and at least six cases that ended at the 
district court level.145 
Bopp believes that judges’ opinions on controversial issues should 
be publicized so voters can make informed decisions at the polls. 
“Anybody who tells you it doesn’t matter what judge you get is a fool,” 
Bopp said in an interview. “Judges have discretion,” he continued, 
“[t]heir personal opinions matter and their views matter.”146 As Bopp 
explains, judges should be free to express their views and then be 
expected to enforce the law.147 Critics believe that, rather than fighting 
for judicial candidates’ speech rights, Bopp is using the First 
Amendment to attack judicial independence and make judges 
“ideologically accountable.”148 
In the wake of White, a number of partisan interest groups, 
particularly single-issue organizations, have begun soliciting judges’ 
views on hot-button issues prior to their initial or retention elections 
through judicial candidate questionnaires.149 The often politically 
conservative150 non-profit organizations send judicial candidates 
 
 144. James Bopp served as counsel in Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 F.3d 
1107 (10th Cir. 2008), Indiana Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 507 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 
2007), and Pennsylvania Family Institute, Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 145. James Bopp served as counsel in both district court cases declaring 
judicial candidate speech restrictions unconstitutional—North Dakota Family 
Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D.N.D. 2005) and Family Trust 
Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004)—as 
well as the district court case upholding judicial candidate speech restrictions—
Pennsylvania Family Institute, Inc. v. Celluci, 521 F. Supp. 2d 351 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
He also served as counsel in a district court case declaring a recusal statute 
unconstitutional, Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d 968 (W.D. Wis. 2007); a 
district court case upholding a recusal statute, Florida Family Policy Council v. 
Freeman, No. 4:06cv395-RH/WCS (N.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2007); and a district court 
case dismissing a challenge to provisions of the Arizona Code of Judicial 
Conduct on ripeness grounds, Wolfson v. Brammer, No. CIV 06-2357-PHX-SMM, 
2007 WL 2288024 (D. Ariz. August 8, 2007). 
 146. Terry Carter, The Big Bopper, ABA J., Nov. 2006, at 33, available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/the_big_bopper/; see also 
Chemerinsky, supra note 35, at 736 (“Judges often have discretion in deciding the 
content of legal rules and in applying them to specific cases . . . . The beliefs and 
views of a judge inevitably influence how that discretion will be exercised.”). 
 147. Carter, supra note 146, at 33. 
 148. Id. at 34. Mark Harrison, Chair of the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate 
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct said, “I don’t think he’d admit this, but he 
wants judges who are ideologically accountable, which is inimical to the 
Constitution.” Id. 
 149. See Roy Schotland, Impacts of White, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 625, 629 (2006–07). 
 150. But see Rebecca Mae Salokar, After White: An Insider’s Thoughts on Judicial 
Campaign Speech, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 149, 156–57 (2005) (discussing a questionnaire 
sent to judicial candidates by SAVE Dade, a gay rights organization based in 
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questionnaires asking their opinions on legal and political issues. While 
giving candidates the option of declining to answer, many 
questionnaires, like the one sent by the Alaska Right to Life Political 
Action Committee, warn candidates that the organization will 
encourage its members to vote against the election or retention of those 
who decline. Through these questionnaires, interest groups pressure 
judicial candidates to make public their views on disputed legal issues; 
candidates who decline to answer face the groups’ opposition as well as 
criticism that declining to answer is “cowardly.”151 
Further, the option to decline is paired with a pre-drafted reason 
for declining. This allows the organization to allege in a subsequent 
lawsuit that judicial candidates declined to answer for fear of being 
disciplined or forced to recuse themselves. In lawsuits brought 
nationwide to challenge judicial candidates’ speech restrictions, non-
profit organizations—rather than the judges whose speech is being 
restricted—are often the plaintiffs.152 
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ALASKA’S RESTRICTIONS ON 
JUDICIAL CANDIDATE SPEECH AFTER WHITE 
While plaintiffs have been frustrated by circuit courts dismissing 
their cases on justiciability grounds, future cases, particularly those in 
which judicial candidates join as plaintiffs and request official advisory 
opinions, may survive justiciability inquiries.153 And although Alaska 
 
southern Florida, soliciting judicial candidates’ opinions on issues relating to 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
 151. See Brennan Center Brief, supra note 33, at 18 (“Unlike federal court 
nominees seeking confirmation, state judicial candidates often cannot afford the 
luxury of refusing to answer the questionnaires.”) As a footnote argues, “[F]acial 
invalidation of the Pledges Clause would almost invariably result in pressure for 
promises inconsistent with litigants’ rights to due process.” Id. at n.8. 
 152. See Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2008); Ind. Right 
to Life v. Shepard, 507 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2007); Alaska Right to Life Political 
Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007); Pa. Family Institute v. 
Black, 489 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2007); Wolfson v. Brammer, No. CIV 06-2357-PHX-
SMM, 2007 WL 2288024 (D. Ariz. Aug. 8, 2007) (including as plaintiff Alliance 
Defense Fund Legal Center); Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d 968 (W.D. Wis. 
2007) (including as plaintiff Wisconsin Right to Life); N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. 
v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D.N.D. 2005); Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. 
Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004). But see Spargo v. N.Y. State 
Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003) (state judge and two of 
his political supporters initiated lawsuit); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (judicial candidate and registered voter initiated lawsuit). 
 153. See, e.g., Bauer v. Shepard, No. 3:08-CV-196-TLS, 2008 WL 1994868 (N.D. 
Ind. May 6, 2008) (including as plaintiffs Indiana Right to Life and two judicial 
candidates to address standing problems of previous lawsuit). 
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Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Feldman was dismissed, 
provisions of the Alaska’s judicial candidate speech restrictions may be 
challenged again. Alaska Right to Life sent a second questionnaire to 
Alaska judges before the 2008 retention election154 and plans to get 
involved in Alaska’s 2010 judicial retention elections as well.155 
A. Ripeness and Standing Hurdles 
Any challenge to Alaska’s judicial candidate speech restrictions will 
have to overcome justiciability obstacles. First, the ripeness issue156 will 
not disappear. Under Commission rules, only the Commission may 
issue a formal advisory opinion—a process involving research, collective 
analysis and deliberation, drafting, and revision that may take months 
to complete.157 Though a judge once requested an official advisory 
opinion from the Commission, the Commission has never issued a 
formal advisory opinion about the propriety of judges answering 
AKRTL’s questionnaires and currently does not have plans to do so.158 
As long as the Commission does not issue such an opinion, Greenstein 
says she will continue to provide judges with informal guidance.159 “If 
we can provide judges with the guidance they’re seeking and avoid 
litigation, we think that’s the more prudent course,” she said.160 
Greenstein does not expect any judges to quarrel with that decision; she 
knows from conversations with judges around Alaska that the vast 
majority of judges simply do not want to fill out questionnaires like 
 
 154. See Alaska Right to Life Committee Judicial Candidate Questionnaire 
[hereinafter Alaska Right to Life 2008 Judicial Questionnaire] (mailed to Alaska 
judges Sept. 2008) (on file with author). 
 155. Interview with Karen Lewis, supra note 68. 
 156. The Ninth Circuit dismissed Alaska Right to Life Political Action Committee 
v. Feldman on ripeness grounds because it held that plaintiffs had not shown a 
threat of investigation by the Committee and of disciplinary action by the Alaska 
Supreme Court. As the Ninth Circuit held, Greenstein’s letter to AKRTL and 
Alaska judges was not a Commission-issued formal advisory opinion.  See supra 
Part II.C. 
 157. Comment from Jeffrey Feldman, supra note 76; see also Alaska Court 
System – 2007–2008 Alaska Judicial Conduct Commission Rules, Commission-
Issued Advisory Opinions, http://www.state.ak.us/courts/jcc.htm#19 (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2008). 
 158. Interview with Marla Greenstein, supra note 74. Under the Commission’s 
rules, the Commission chair determines which matters will be placed on the 
agenda for full Commission consideration. Alaska Judicial Conduct Commission 
Rules, Rule 1(c)(1); see also supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the 
decision to handle judges’ inquiries about AKRTL’s 2002 questionnaire 
informally). 
 159. Interview with Marla Greenstein, supra note 74. 
 160. Id. 
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AKRTL’s.161 Without a formal opinion that answering such a 
questionnaire violates the Alaska Code or evidence that the Commission 
and Alaska Supreme Court would consider disciplinary action against a 
judge, a future challenge is unlikely to clear the ripeness hurdle. 
Any future plaintiff will also have to meet standing requirements, 
although the Ninth Circuit has not addressed this issue. In First 
Amendment law, a willing listener has standing to challenge speech 
restrictions—but only where a willing speaker is also present.162 In other 
words, if AKRTL wants to hear judges’ views on controversial legal 
issues, it has standing to bring a lawsuit if: (1) one or more judges are 
willing to speak on those issues, and (2) would speak but for a speech 
restriction such as the Alaska Code. If the vast majority of judges are not 
interested in responding to these partisan questionnaires, it will be hard 
to show that any judge would do so but for the Code’s pledges and 
promises clause or commit clause.163 To address some standing 
problems,164 AKRTL’s 2008 questionnaire provided judges with five 
possible responses: “Agree,” “Disagree,” “Undecided,” “Decline to 
Answer,” and “Refuse to Answer.”165 The predrafted reasoning for the 
“Decline to Answer” option was also specifically tied to the pledges and 
promises clause and commit clause.166 According to AKRTL, none of the 
judges who received its 2008 questionnaire responded by checking any 
of the responses provided.167 
Nonetheless, despite these justiciability hurdles, even one judge 
interested in challenging Alaska’s judicial speech restrictions would 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 756–57 (1976) (holding that where a willing speaker has a right to 
speak, listeners have a “reciprocal right to receive” that speech); see also Pa. 
Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2007) (dismissing case 
where plaintiff challenging speech restrictions did not establish the presence of a 
willing speaker). 
 163. The “decline” option on AKRTL’s questionnaire was tied to predrafted 
reasoning—that answering is prohibited or would require the judges’ later 
recusal—intended to meet this “but for” requirement. First, this did not tie the 
judges’ demurral to one specific clause but to all restrictions generally. Second, it 
may be unpersuasive because the judges themselves did not draft it. See Black, 
489 F.3d at 168–69 (holding that predrafted content of footnote in plaintiffs’ 
questionnaire did not necessarily reflect views of judicial candidates). 
 164. See id. (articulating difficulties demonstrating plaintiff’s standing in a 
similar case). 
 165. See Alaska Right to Life 2008 Judicial Questionnaire, supra note 154. 
 166. See id. (“By checking this option, I hereby attest that I would have replied 
to this question but for the prospect that I may be disciplined for doing so under 
Alaska Judicial Canon 5A(3)(d) . . .”). The recusal clause, which all but one court 
has found constitutional, see supra Part III.B,  was not mentioned. See id. 
 167. Interview with Karen Lewis, supra note 68. 
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have the power to meet justiciability requirements. If AKRTL locates just 
one judge eager to speak but afraid to violate the Alaska Code, the 
standing requirement would be met. Further, one judge, upon receiving 
AKRTL’s questionnaire, could issue a written request for a formal 
advisory opinion from the Commission. If the Commission issued a 
formal opinion forbidding him to respond to the questionnaire or chose 
not to issue a formal opinion at all,168 the judge could file a lawsuit 
requesting review of the restrictions. He could also opt to answer the 
questionnaire and file a lawsuit only if sanctioned. Under both 
scenarios, the judge would likely meet the ripeness requirement. 
B. Judicial Candidate Speech Restrictions in a Merit-Based System 
of Judicial Selection 
If AKRTL is able to reach the merits in a future lawsuit, it would 
still face distinctions between the facts of White and the situation in 
Alaska. The most interesting of these distinctions is judicial selection: 
while judges in Minnesota are elected, Alaska uses the merit system. 
The nature of the judicial election—and possibly the role of voters 
in the election—may be different in a merit system. In White, Minnesota 
voters were being asked to elect judges from among true judicial 
candidates. In Alaska, they are given the Council’s evaluation of the 
judges’ performance along several nonpartisan criteria and the Council’s 
nonpartisan recommendation for retention or non-retention. A voter can 
certainly vote to retain or not retain a judge for any reason, including 
disagreement over that judge’s decisions, but a retention election is 
structured around the hope that voters will weigh a judge’s past judicial 
performance and determine whether he is competent and qualified to 
remain in office.169 Along these lines, some commentators argue that 
voters in a retention election are entitled to different information than 
voters in a contested judicial election.170 
 
 168. In White, for example, one of the petitioners, a judicial candidate, sought 
an advisory opinion from the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility 
Board, but the Lawyers Board declined to provide one. Republican Party of 
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 769 (2002). 
 169. Cady & Phelps, supra note 12, at 372. While selection commissions 
evaluate what a judicial candidate would bring to the bench, voters in a 
retention election also have the benefit of knowing how a judge has performed 
once placed in the role. Id. 
 170. See, e.g., id. at 368. As two commentators, a state court justice and a law 
clerk, wrote: 
[T]he adoption of merit selection is a giant step towards eliminating 
any need for a retention voter to know the personal views of a judge 
and, in turn, the need for a judge to exercise the right to express 
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In addition, a merit system of judicial selection may change the 
posture of the judge-as-potential-speaker. In Minnesota, he is a true 
candidate for judicial office; in Alaska, he is already draped in the robes 
of judicial office.171 Insofar as partisan speech by a judge, whom society 
trusts to be impartial, is more unseemly than partisan speech by a 
candidate who is not yet a judge, this distinction is important. 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in White does not seem to leave 
much room for nuanced differentiation between judicial and legislative 
elections,172 much less between different kinds of judicial elections. 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, however, specifically links the outcome 
in the case to Minnesota’s adoption of a pure election system.173 Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence also creates space to distinguish between 
election and merit-based systems of judicial selection by emphasizing 
that White does not decide the constitutionality of restricting sitting 
judges’ speech through judicial conduct codes.174 Although the Alaska 
 
personal views on political and legal issues. Information relevant to a 
retention election relates to professional competency and performance 
on the bench. 
Id. Other commentators take the opposite position. As Erwin Chemerinsky, law 
school dean and constitutional law professor, wrote: 
A judicial candidate’s ideology is an appropriate consideration in any 
judicial selection process for the obvious reason that it reflects how the 
person will likely decide cases. This is not to lessen the importance of 
professional qualifications and judicial temperament; they obviously 
are always considerations. But they alone are not sufficient for 
evaluating judicial candidates. 
See Chemerinsky, supra note 35, at 738. 
 171. During oral argument in the Ninth Circuit for Alaska Right to Life Political 
Action Committee v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007), one judge on the panel 
emphasized this distinction. In Alaska, those receiving questionnaires are “being 
asked to speak as judges. It’s very different from candidates” (emphasis added) 
(oral arguments on file with journal). 
 172. White, 536 U.S. at 783–84. While leaving open the possibility that the First 
Amendment could allow more regulation of campaigns for judicial than 
legislative office, Justice Scalia argues that, because “state-court judges possess 
the power to ‘make’ common law [and] . . . to shape the States’ constitutions,” 
judges are not completely separate from the “enterprise of ‘representative 
government.’” Id. 
 173. Id. at 789–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Minnesota has chosen to select 
its judges through contested popular elections instead of through an 
appointment system or a combined appointment and retention election system 
along the lines of the Missouri Plan.”); see supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 174. White, 536 U.S. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This case does not 
present the question whether a State may restrict the speech of judges because 
they are judges—for example, as part of a code of judicial conduct; the law at 
issue here regulates judges only when and because they are candidates.”). 
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Code explicitly restricts the speech of any “candidate for judicial 
office,”175 retention elections by nature involve sitting judges. 
Alaska’s judicial speech restrictions may survive strict scrutiny if 
courts choose to read these concurrences carefully. Courts could, for 
example, differentiate between judicial candidate speech restrictions in 
pure election systems and in merit-based systems. They might also 
distinguish between restricting the speech of new candidates for judicial 
office and restricting the speech of sitting judges standing for retention. 
Along those lines, and further distinguishing its judicial speech 
restrictions from of Minnesota, Alaska could revise its Code to restrict 
only the speech of sitting judges. 
C. Constitutionality of Alaska’s “Pledges and Promises Clause” and 
“Commit Clause” 
If a challenge to the pledges and promises clause and commit 
clause survives ripeness and standing inquiries and courts do not 
differentiate between speech restrictions in election and merit-based 
judicial selection systems, the clauses would likely be held 
unconstitutional. Although Alaska’s pledges and promises clause and 
commit clause are different from the announce clause at issue in White, 
the broad reasoning in White’s majority opinion probably renders this 
distinction inconsequential.176 
Government speech restrictions must meet strict scrutiny when 
they are content-based restrictions.177 Alaska’s pledges and promises 
clause and commit clause are content-based speech restrictions because 
they regulate the topics upon which judicial candidates are permitted to 
speak.178 Thus, to be constitutional, the clauses must meet strict scrutiny 
 
 175. Under the Alaska Code, a person becomes a judicial candidate when he 
“makes a public announcement of candidacy [or] declares or files as a candidate 
with the election or appointment authority . . .” Alaska Code of Judicial 
Conduct, Terminology, “Candidate.” This applies to individuals seeking judicial 
nomination and judges seeking retention. Id. at “Candidate for judicial office.” 
 176. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 135, at 81–95, 98–107 (considering the majority 
opinion’s denial that judicial elections are different from other political elections, 
its application of strict scrutiny, and its discussion of a judicial role in 
lawmaking). 
 177. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992); see also Brown v. 
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1982) (holding that, unless the regulation meets 
strict scrutiny, the government may not prohibit candidates for elected office 
from making campaign promises to conduct that office in a way beneficial to 
certain voter groups). 
 178. See, e.g., Burson, 504 U.S. at 197 (“This Court has held that the First 
Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to a 
restriction on a particular viewpoint, but also to a prohibition of public 
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by being narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.179 Under 
the majority’s approach in White, judicial impartiality may be a 
compelling state interest where it refers to a lack of bias for or against a 
party to a proceeding but is not a compelling state interest where it 
refers to a lack of bias for or against a particular legal view.180 It is 
unclear whether judicial impartiality in the sense of open-mindedness 
could be a compelling state interest.181 The majority opinion addressed 
only state interests in impartiality and the appearance of impartiality;182 
thus it is plausible that other state interests in judicial candidate speech 
restrictions could be compelling. 
Alaska’s commit clause183 does not address bias with respect to 
parties to a proceeding and therefore does not serve the compelling state 
interest in White. If the commit clause was intended to serve a state 
interest in judicial open-mindedness, it is under-inclusive because like 
the announce clause, it only restricts speech by judicial candidates and 
not sitting judges.184 More likely, Alaska’s commit clause, which 
explicitly targets statements committing candidates to “a particular view 
or decision,” is also intended to ensure judicial impartiality in terms of a 
 
discussion of an entire topic.”). To be content-neutral, a speech restriction must 
be both viewpoint neutral, meaning it regulates speech irrespective of the 
ideology expressed, and subject-matter neutral, meaning it regulates speech 
irrespective of the topic of speech. Id. 
 179. See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 774–75. 
 180. Id. at 775–78. 
 181. Id. at 778–80. 
 182. Id. at 775. Though the Eighth Circuit also referred to a state interest in an 
“independent” judiciary in its decision, the Supreme Court noted that the Eighth 
Circuit treated the state interest in an “independent” judiciary and in an 
“impartial” judiciary as one in the same. Id. at 775 n.6. It is unclear, then, 
whether a state’s interest in judicial independence could be treated as a separate 
state interest in the future. 
 183. The commit clause prohibits judicial candidates from “mak[ing] 
statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate to a particular view or 
decision with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come 
before the court.” Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (2006) 
(emphasis added). 
 184. The Supreme Court was skeptical that Minnesota sought to promote 
judicial open-mindedness via its announce clause. As the Court pointed out, 
“statements in election campaigns are such an infinitesimal portion of the public 
commitments to legal positions that judges (or judges-to-be)” often express their 
legal views in books, speeches, and through teaching—activities unrestricted, 
and in some cases encouraged, by the Minnesota Code. White, 536 U.S. at 779–80. 
This argument suggests that courts could be similarly skeptical of the commit 
clause as a vehicle for promoting judicial open-mindedness and offers another 
reason why the commit clause could be found under-inclusive. 
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lack of bias for or against a particular legal view—a state interest that the 
White court held was not compelling.185 
Whether commit clauses have narrower restrictions186 than 
announce clauses or whether they “are one and the same” is an open 
question.187 Nonetheless, commit clauses are vulnerable for several 
reasons. First, by restricting speech “with respect to cases, controversies 
or issues that are likely to come before the court,”188 a commit clause can 
restrict judicial speech on almost any issue. According to the White 
majority, limiting speech restrictions to issues likely to come before a 
court “is not much of a limitation at all.”189 Second, by prohibiting 
statements that actually commit candidates to particular views and 
decisions as well as statements that “appear to commit” candidates,190 a 
commit clause may be interpreted as broadly as an announce clause. As 
acknowledged in the Alaska Code Commentary, some listeners might 
interpret a judicial candidate’s description of his legal philosophy as 
committing him “to a particular view or decision.”191 If that is the case, 
the commit clause may be too broad to meet strict scrutiny.192 If the 
commit clause’s “appear to commit” language is not read broadly, 
however, it is unclear what it would add to the pledges and promises 
clause.193 Finally, as stated earlier, Alaska’s commit clause restricts only 
 
 185. Id. at 777–79. 
 186. In 1990, the ABA replaced the announce clause with the commit clause 
because it deemed the announce clause “an overly broad restriction on speech” 
and the commit clause was intended to be a narrower restriction.  See Richard 
Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 203 (2004). 
 187. White, 536 U.S. at 773 n.5. 
 188. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (2006). 
 189. White, 536 U.S. at 772 (Of disputes “that are the proper . . . business of 
state courts, ‘[t]here is almost no legal or political issue that is unlikely to come 
before a judge of an American court, state or federal, of general jurisdiction.’”) 
(quoting Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
 190. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (2006). 
 191. See Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d) and Commentary 
to Canon 5A(3)(d) (2006). 
 192. See Briffault, supra note 186, at 217 (observing that the language “appear 
to commit” may allow state commissions and supreme courts to use the clause 
against judicial candidates making statements of judicial philosophy or political 
belief). 
 193. See Briffault, supra note 186, at 216–19 (noting that the concept of 
committing oneself to a course of action is very similar to the concept of 
pledging a course of action and that the ABA folded the commit clause into the 
pledges and promises clause in its amended Model Code). 
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judicial candidates’ speech194 and is probably under-inclusive for that 
reason.195 
The pledges and promises clause196 seems more narrowly tailored 
for preventing judicial candidates from committing themselves to future 
judicial conduct than the commit clause. By requiring the use of 
promissory language, the clause implies a candidate’s intent to bind 
himself to specific conduct.197  While the difference between a judicial 
candidate announcing his views on an issue and making a pledge to rule 
a particular way may be small, promissory language challenges judicial 
open-mindedness more than statements of one’s judicial perspective.198 
The pledges and promises clause, however, prohibits all judicial 
candidates’ pledges and promises “other than to faithfully and 
impartially perform the duties of the office.”199 This is problematic 
because many statements could be considered pledges of future 
conduct. For example, if a judicial candidate makes a pledge to 
streamline the administrative functions of the court,200 his statement is 
prohibited by the text of the pledges and promises clause though it is 
not a threat to judicial open-mindedness. A court is unlikely to consider 
such a ban a narrow restriction on judicial candidate speech.201 
Furthermore, both Alaska’s pledges and promises clause and commit 
 
 194. Although Alaska’s retention elections by nature involve sitting judges, 
the Alaska Code restricts only the speech of “candidate[s] for judicial office.” See 
infra Part IV.B. 
 195. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 779–80 (2002). 
 196. The pledges and promises clause prohibits judicial candidates from 
“mak[ing] pledges or promises of conduct in judicial office other than to 
faithfully and impartially perform the duties of the office.” Alaska Code of 
Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (2006). 
 197. In discussing a possible state interest in judicial open-mindedness, 
Justice Scalia rejected Justice Stevens’ argument that judges could be more 
reluctant to contradict, in a subsequent ruling, campaign statements than 
statements made at other times. White, 536 U.S. at 780. He added, however, that 
such a situation “might be plausible, perhaps, with regard to campaign promises” 
and noted that the pledges and promises clause was not under consideration. Id. 
 198. See Briffault, supra note 186, at 213–14. 
 199. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (2006) (emphasis 
added). 
 200. While “how [he] would handle administrative duties if elected” was on a 
list of pre-approved topics for judicial candidates in White, the Alaska Code 
provides no such list. White, 536 U.S. at 774. 
 201. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 135, at 116–21; Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry 
Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that the pledges and promises 
clause restricted potentially problematic judicial campaign speech “in the most 
comprehensive way possible”). 
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clause may be vulnerable to overbreadth202 and vagueness203 
challenges.204 
The Alaska Supreme Court, the final authority on the Alaska Code 
of Judicial Conduct, could adopt narrow constructions of the pledges 
and promises clause and commit clause as several other state courts 
have done.205 Because the plain texts of the clauses do not support such a 
narrow interpretation, however, redrafting the clauses and rendering 
their language and meaning consistent may be a more appropriate 
remedy.206 
 
 202. Overbroad laws are laws that legitimately regulate unprotected speech 
but may have the effect of discouraging, or chilling, protected speech. See, e.g., 
Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 967–68 (1984). As the 
Supreme Court has noted, “[P]ersons whose expression is constitutionally 
protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal 
sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected 
expression.” Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (invalidating a law 
prohibiting “opprobrious words or abusive language” for overbreadth where 
state courts had not narrowly construed the law). 
 203. Like overbroad laws, vague laws—laws for which a reasonable person 
cannot distinguish what activity is permissible from what activity is 
prohibited—may also chill protected speech. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
433 (1963) (invalidating a law prohibiting attorneys from soliciting clients). 
Because of the danger that such laws could chill protected speech, “standards of 
permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression.” Id. at 
432. See also Chemerinsky, supra note 35, at 740 (considering vagueness of Model 
Code pledges and promises and commit clauses). 
 204. No individual is better positioned to know what the law permits or 
prohibits than a judge. Several of the judges running for retention in 2002, 
however, said they did not know whether Alaska’s Code of Judicial Conduct 
permitted or prohibited responses to AKRTL’s questionnaire. In his response to 
AKRTL’s questionnaire, Justice Carpeneti wrote that he was “not at all certain 
that responding to your group’s questions is allowed under the Alaska code.” 
Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. Complaint, supra note 69, at Exhibit 
E-1 to E-2. Judge Pengilly was also unsure of whether his speech was permitted, 
saying, “[G]iven the uncertainty surrounding the situation, it appears that the 
appropriate response to your questionnaire under present circumstances is to 
decline to answer.” Id. at E-10. He added, “[I]t is far from clear that judges in 
Alaska have [the] freedom” to discuss the issues raised in AKRTL’s 
questionnaire. Id. While the judges may have been using the Alaska Code as an 
excuse not to answer the questionnaire, their statements could also be 
interpreted as genuine uncertainty. 
 205. See In re Kinsey, 842 So.2d 77, 87 (Fla. 2003); In re Watson, 794 N.E. 2d 1, 6 
(N.Y. 2003) (construing New York’s pledges and promises clause as allowing all 
pledges and promises except those inconsistent with the impartial performance 
of duty). 
 206. The ABA’s 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct offers one possible 
guide. See supra Part III.B. 
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V. MAINTAINING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN ALASKA 
Invalidating Alaska’s judicial candidate speech restrictions would 
strip judges of one excuse for not responding to questions like those 
posed by AKRTL’s questionnaire. This would give new license to 
partisan individuals and interest groups who want to question judges, 
punish those who decline to answer with non-retention campaigns, and 
could damage the strong nonpartisan culture and independence of 
Alaska’s judiciary. 
When lower courts interpreted White to invalidate announce clause 
restrictions, some observers noted heightened politicization in judicial 
campaigns.207 Increased politicization is apparent in states that select 
judges through partisan judicial elections208 and, to a lesser extent, in 
states that utilize nonpartisan elections.209 “[M]any candidates conclude 
that they cannot afford to occupy the moral high ground in the heat of a 
campaign,” explained the Brennan Center for Justice in an amicus 
brief.210 Recognizing the effect that invalidating Alaska’s judicial speech 
restrictions could have on the independence of Alaska’s judiciary, this 
Part explores ways to combat future partisan attacks on judges in the 
absence of those restrictions. 
 
 207. See, e.g., Brennan Center Brief, supra note 33. Even before White, both 
ideological and business-related interest groups have been involved in judicial 
elections for some time, and observers had noted their increasing influence. See 
Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1391, 1394–1407 (2001). 
 208. George W. Soule, The Threats of Partisanship to Minnesota’s Judicial 
Elections, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 701, 716–21 (2008). In Illinois and Alabama, 
both partisan election states, judicial candidates in recent elections spent millions 
of dollars campaigning. Id. at 716–18. In Alabama, campaigns commonly 
reference controversial issues; the incumbent chief justice, for example, told 
voters that “[i]ssues relating to the right to life and the sanctity of marriage are 
in the soul of Alabamians, and they want a judge who shares their conservative 
views.” Id. at 717 (quoting Drew Jubera, There's Nothing Civil About Alabama 
Judicial Race, ATLANTA J. CONST., June 5, 2006, at A2). In Texas, also a partisan 
election state, the 2006 election saw Democratic judicial candidates defeat 
Republican judicial candidates in twenty-eight contests. Id. at 718. Only five 
Republican judges, all running unopposed, retained their seats. Id. “The voters 
didn’t differentiate between the good and bad Democrats, nor the good and bad 
Republicans, opting for a wholesale party swap without regard to each 
candidate’s particular qualifications.” Id. (quoting Matt Pulle, Accidental Victors, 
DALLAS OBSERVER, Nov. 16, 2006). 
 209. Soule, supra note 208, at 718–19. In Wisconsin, a nonpartisan election 
state, two judicial candidates in a 2007 election were nonetheless identified with 
the Democrat and Republican parties. Id. The race cost $6 million, and both 
candidates were disappointed by the overwhelming presence of third parties 
and the importance of campaign contributions. Id. at 719. 
 210. Brennan Center Brief, supra note 33, at 4. 
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A. Culture of the Judiciary and Merit-Based Selection Revisited 
To maintain the independence and integrity of its judiciary in the 
face of partisan interest groups’ involvement in retention elections, 
Alaska’s most powerful asset is the judicial culture developed by its 
merit-based selection system. Simply stated, judges do not have to 
respond to interest groups’ questionnaires or phone calls soliciting their 
views on controversial issues. Judge Murphy’s response to AKRTL’s 
questionnaire, declining to answer any questions because doing so 
would contravene his personal Judge’s Code, is evidence that Alaska 
judges may decline for reasons beyond fear of being disciplined.211 In 
the wake of White, as one commentator has stated, “traditional norms 
are bound to loosen,”212 and judicial candidates may feel increasingly 
comfortable voicing their viewpoints on controversial legal and political 
issues when they find it politically advantageous. Merit selection, 
however, resists this tide by creating an institutional disincentive to 
judicial engagement in partisan activities and a stronger culture of 
nonpartisan judicial conduct. As one Alaska judge explained, partisan 
behavior goes against the grain of the nonpartisan, non-adversarial 
selection process in which Alaska judges have practiced and have been 
selected.213 The vast majority of judges thus view partisan behavior with 
a “sense of distaste.”214 
In his White concurrence, Justice Kennedy discussed the importance 
of creating a judicial culture that values and promotes impartiality: 
“Explicit standards of judicial conduct,” Justice Kennedy asserted, 
“provide essential guidance for judges in the proper discharge of their 
duties and honorable conduct of their office.”215 They also encourage 
judicial candidates and sitting judges to strive for integrity within their 
profession.216 While not restricting judicial campaign speech, such 
standards may nonetheless dissuade judicial candidates from 
addressing certain issues in the interest of maintaining the integrity of 
 
 211. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 212. Schotland, supra note 149, at 629 (noting that, one day after the Supreme 
Court denied review of the Eighth Circuit’s en banc decision narrowing 
prohibitions against candidates’ personally soliciting campaign funds, a judicial 
candidate in Arkansas sent emails soliciting funding). 
 213. A superior court judge shared this sentiment with the author of this 
Note; to preserve his anonymity, he will remain unnamed. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 763, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 216. Id. 
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the state judicial system. Other commentators have emphasized the role 
of public education in maintaining a nonpartisan judicial culture.217 
To further institutionalize Alaska’s nonpartisan judicial tradition, 
Alaska bar members could also establish an independent organization to 
assist judges in neutralizing partisan attacks against them. This 
organization could maintain funds to finance the last-minute counter-
campaigns of judges recommended for retention but nonetheless 
targeted by partisan attacks. It could also assist judges in planning their 
counter-campaigns.218 
Finally, if partisan groups choose to contact sitting judges, judicial 
nominees, or judicial applicants to discern their views on legal and 
political issues, those organizations should be required to notify the 
Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct and the Alaska Judicial Council 
of their communication with those individuals. If an organization 
decides to send judges a questionnaire, for example, it would have to 
send a copy of that questionnaire to the Commission and the Council. 
Most importantly, this would increase the transparency of partisan 
groups’ interactions with judges. The Commission or the Council could 
then make a decision about whether to post the questionnaire on a 
public forum as a way of educating the public about partisan pressures 
the judges are facing or to simply notify all Alaska judges about the 
contact so they may be prepared in the event they are likewise 
contacted. 
B. Recusal and Judicial Disqualification as Remedies 
In his White concurrence, Justice Kennedy offered strict recusal 
clauses as an alternative to judicial speech restrictions for ensuring 
judicial impartiality. Minnesota, he said, “may adopt recusal standards 
more rigorous than due process requires, and censure judges who 
violate these standards.”219 Commentators also look to recusal clauses as 
 
 217. See Jessica Gall, Living With Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: The 
Birth and Death of Judicial Campaign Speech Restrictions, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 97, 
123–26 (2008); Cady & Phelps, supra note 12, at 369–80. 
 218. An organization could provide, as models, the print ads published by 
supporters of Justices Rabinowitz and Fabe and Judge Tan emphasizing the 
jurists’ nonpartisan professional qualifications for the bench. Given the relatively 
narrow reach of newspapers when compared with television and the Internet, it 
could also consider those methods of communication tastefully and effectively 
to support the judge’s retention campaign. 
 219. White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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constitutional means of safeguarding the impartiality of state 
judiciaries.220 
Alaska’s recusal clause, which requires that judges recuse 
themselves where their “impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned,”221 likely meets strict scrutiny. It serves a clearly compelling 
state interest in providing impartial judges so litigants receive due 
process222 and is narrowly tailored to achieve this compelling interest.223 
As a district court in Florida noted in the course of upholding a recusal 
clause broader than that in the Alaska Code,224 such a clause 
prohibits speech not at all, and burdens speech only a trifle, 
allowing a judge to keep the same job at the same pay and to 
perform the same type of work with the same perquisites while 
giving up only the right to preside over cases (presumably few 
if any) in which the judge reasonably appears not to have an 
open mind.225 
Though designed to prevent judges from sitting on cases where 
their lack of impartiality or appearance of lack of impartiality threatens 
litigants due process,226 critics have suggested that using recusal clauses 
to fill the void left by vanishing judicial candidate speech restrictions is a 
solution that “suffers from a deep manageability problem.”227 States, 
 
 220. See Gall, supra note 217, at 123; see also Carrington, supra note 42, at 115 
(suggesting that a judge should be disqualified from sitting on cases where a 
large contributor to his campaign is a party or has a significant financial 
interest). 
 221. Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(1) (2006). The recusal clause 
also identifies appropriate grounds for recusal, including personal bias 
concerning a party or party’s lawyer as one ground for disqualification. Personal 
bias concerning an issue is not identified as a ground for disqualification. See 
Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(1)(a) (2006). 
 222. See N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1043 (D. 
N.D. 2005). Both “[t]he public and individual litigants must be reassured that the 
judiciary will decide legal disputes based on the law alone rather than on any 
inherent bias or prejudice of the presiding judge.” Id. (citing Family Trust 
Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004)). 
 223. See Fla. Family Policy Council v. Freeman, No. 4:06cv395-RH/WCS (N.D. 
Fla. Sept. 11, 2007) (upholding clause requiring recusal where a judge “made a 
public statement that commits, or appears to commit, the judge with respect to . . 
. an issue in the proceeding [or] a controversy in the proceeding”). 
 224. Upholding a very similar recusal clause, a district court in Kentucky 
noted that “due process concerns do not necessarily require recusal in every case 
in which a judge has expressed an opinion,” so “recusal is not required in every 
instance in which a judge has expressed a view – publicly or not – on a certain 
issue.” Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 709. 
 225. Freeman, No. 4:06cv395-RH/WCS at *8. 
 226. Gall, supra note 217, at 121. 
 227. Developments in the Law – Voting and Democracy, Judicial Elections and 
Free Speech, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1142 (2006). 
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they assert, will have difficulty identifying the point at which a judge’s 
speech or conduct, whether during his campaign or while on the bench, 
indicates he may not be impartial.228 Further, a recusal remedy 
ultimately relies upon judges’ awareness of their own potential biases 
and willingness to recuse themselves or upon parties’ awareness of 
judges’ biases and willingness to move for recusal.229 
This criticism overlooks a second benefit of recusal clauses in the 
context of judicial speech: strict recusal clauses also protect judicial 
candidates’ right not to speak about controversial legal and political 
issues by providing a judicially responsible—and politically excusable—
reason to decline response.230 If judges are not clamoring to respond to 
partisan interest groups’ questionnaires or other means of soliciting their 
views, the recusal clause may be a very effective remedy. 
Another remedy, which few commentators have considered, is 
peremptory disqualification. Peremptory disqualification may help 
ensure judicial impartiality while avoiding some of the disadvantages 
that recusal presents. Unlike disqualification for cause, which suggests a 
judge may not ethically sit on a case because his or her bias in that 
matter may be inferred,231 peremptory disqualification, allows a party to 
reject a judge for any reason or no reason at all.232 
Under Alaska Criminal Rule 25(d) and Alaska Civil Rule 42(c), one 
peremptory challenge per litigant is a matter of right—at least at the trial 
court level.233 Parties must file a “Notice of Change of Judge,” but they 
 
 228. Id. 
 229. See Mary Eileen Weicher, The Expansion of the First Amendment in Judicial 
Elections: Another Cause for Reform, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 833, 888 (2007). 
 230. Roy Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1077, 1102 (2007). In response to solicitations for their views on these issues, 
judicial candidates may say, “I know what you would like me to say, but if I go 
into that then I will be unable to sit in just the cases you care about most.” Id. In 
contested elections, they may also turn the tables on opponents who have 
already answered the questions for political gain: “My opponent has told you 
what he thinks you want [to hear], but has not told you that he will not be able 
to deliver because he will be disqualified from the cases you care about.” Id. 
 231. See ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.020 (2006); Marla N. Greenstein, Judicial 
Disqualification in Alaska Courts, 17 ALASKA L. REV. 53, 61–70 (2000). A judge is 
required to recuse himself from sitting on cases where, for example, he is a party 
or has a strong financial interest in the outcome. See ALASKA STAT. § 
22.20.020(a)(4) (2006). Disqualification for cause is not a discretionary matter, 
and the presiding judge may order disqualification if a judge asked to disqualify 
himself does not. See ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.020(c) (2006). 
 232. Alaska is one of seventeen states allowing peremptory challenges to 
judges. Schotland, supra note 230, at 1102; see also Greenstein, supra note 226, at 
61–70. 
 233. ALASKA CRIM. R. 25(d)(1) (“In any criminal case in superior or district 
court, the prosecution and defense shall each be entitled as a matter of right to 
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need not submit an affidavit or specify their reasons for exercising the 
peremptory challenge.234 In Alaska, peremptory disqualification of a 
trial court judge is thus easy to obtain. A party may opt to exercise a 
peremptory challenge against a trial court judge for any reason, rational 
or irrational, including the belief that the judge may be unfair or partial. 
This safety net ensures that litigants receive due process because 
litigants can disqualify trial court judges who may be biased.235 
Moreover, it preserves the unbiased appearance of the judiciary—even if 
a trial court judge is not biased, he may be disqualified simply because 
the litigants appearing before him believe he is biased. 
Knowing this, judicial candidates for trial courts may be less likely 
to engage in partisan speech that could prompt litigants to question 
their impartiality. Where a trial court judge does make partisan 
statements on a controversial issue, litigants appearing before him in a 
matter related to that issue are empowered by Alaska’s peremptory 
challenge rules to have a different judge hear their case. Importantly, 
like the recusal clause, peremptory disqualification also gives judicial 
candidates, at least at the trial court level, a reason for declining to 
disclose their opinions on disputed legal issues: in responding, they risk 
prompting future litigants to use peremptory challenges to disqualify 
them in cases involving those very issues. 
CONCLUSION 
In a talk at Fordham Law School given after she stepped down 
from the Supreme Court, Justice O’Connor emphasized that judicial 
election, a tradition particular to the United States, requires sacrificing 
 
one change of judge.”); ALASKA CIV. R. 42(c)(1) (“In an action pending in the 
Superior or District courts, each side shall be entitled as a matter of right to a 
change of one judge and one master.”). 
 234. ALASKA CRIM. R. 25(d)(2); ALASKA CIV. R. 42(c)(1). Litigants may only 
disqualify a judge by filing an affidavit “alleging under oath the belief that a fair 
and impartial trial cannot be obtained.” ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022(a) (2006). As 
the Alaska Supreme Court held, however, Alaska Criminal Rule 25(d) was 
intended to jettison the statutory affidavit requirement and, thus, the procedures 
outlined in Rule 25(d) supersede any inconsistent requirements in section 
22.20.022 of the Alaska Statutes. Gieffels v. State, 552 P.2d 661, 667–68 (Alaska 
1976). Extending this principle to civil proceedings, the Alaska Supreme Court 
held that Alaska Civil Rule 42(c) procedures similarly supersede inconsistent 
statutory requirements, including the affidavit requirement. Tunley v. 
Municipality of Anchorage School Dist., 631 P.2d 67, 70–71 (Alaska 1981). 
 235. Of course each party receives only one peremptory challenge. Thus, if a 
party exercises one peremptory challenge and is assigned a new judge, he may 
not exercise a second peremptory challenge even if he believes the new judge 
will be biased against him. 
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judicial impartiality: “No other nation in the world [elects its judges],” 
she said, “because they realize you’re not going to get fair and impartial 
judges that way.”236 Delegates to the Alaska Constitutional Convention 
came to the same conclusion fifty years ago and adopted a merit-based 
judicial selection system to guarantee fair and impartial judges.237 
Rather than encouraging selection of judges based on neutral 
criteria, partisan groups like Alaska Right to Life aim to make retention 
elections political. The danger in their judicial questionnaires is in 
suggesting to the public, and possibly to judges themselves, that a 
judge’s responsibility is not to be as fair and impartial as possible but, 
instead, to be responsive to voters’ views on a handful of controversial 
issues. Judges hearing challenges to state codes of judicial conduct, 
particularly those brought by such groups, should consider reading 
White narrowly before striking down provisions intended to preserve a 
culture of judicial impartiality. In the meantime, Alaska judges should 
refrain from answering questions that risk making them the pawns of 
partisan interest groups,238 and Alaska bar members should help 
qualified and competent judges prepare counter-campaigns in advance 
of partisan attacks. 
 
 
 236. Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice, With One Eye on Re-Election, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 25, 2008, at A1. 
 237. Alaska Constitutional Convention Minutes Concerning Judicial Selection 
and Retention, 586–87, 611, available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/General/ 
akccon.htm (Judiciary Committee Chairman George McLaughlin declared that, 
if the merit-based system proposed were adopted, it would be “the most 
modern, most liberal, most workable judiciary article of all the constitutions of 
all the forty-nine states”). 
 238. Ind. Right to Life v. Shepard, 507 F.3d 545, 548 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Viewed 
somewhat skeptically, the situation is a chess game.  Candidates may not want 
to answer the questions and would perhaps be happy to have the Code as a 
reason to decline.  When that is true, Right to Life, while ostensibly asserting the 
right of candidates to speak, may, in fact, be acting against what the candidates 
see as their best interests.  And probably much to Right to Life’s dismay, the 
Commission, by taking no action against candidates, is simply not playing.  The 
voters?  One can hope that they can discern when a candidate is ducking a 
legitimate question and when she is legitimately refusing to become a pawn.”). 
